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Information and cognitive process: a communication theory
for design
P. K. Storkerson Institute of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology, USA

Abstract
Design lacks a direct language for discussing meaning as it is experienced and constructed by
receivers, and it lacks operational methods for measuring meaning and relating it to the design
decisions that determine the spatial and temporal composition of communications. Thus, at the heart
of the design process itself is a lacuna.
This paper describes a theoretical approach to bridge the gap by examining how users construct
meaning. The proposed cognitive process model is based on the processes of perception, thought,
and memory: species wide competencies that underlie the manifold social and cultural code systems
of communicative forms. A method is derived to make inferences about that user constructed
meaning on the basis of observable outcomes. The research protocol provides a robust, repeatable,
in situ method that can be used in different communications situations for exploring highly varied
communication questions, and for extending empirically substantiated theory. The research method
can support the development of a larger analytic base for communication design. The research
provides methods in which communication outcomes can be clearly demonstrated, with the
potential for replacing survey and focus group analysis in those situations where they are dubious or
ambiguous with a tool that is simpler to use, more direct in its measures, easier to interpret, and
which can be unobtrusively embedded into pre-existing communications.
The theory and research demonstrate that it is possible to use empirical methods in non-positivist
ways to creatively explore subtle and meaningful ideas about communication and design. The
results of such explorations can be used to create new ways of designing communications.
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Information and cognitive process: a communication theory
for design
Let us begin with two simple premises. First, what distinguishes much designed communication
from art and other forms of expression is accountability, i.e. that it is required to communicate
something specific: either a set of data or facts, or a specific frame for looking at data or facts.
Second, the communication of data and facts relies on frames for interpreting them. Without frames
of reference, facts are meaningless. The dependence of communication on the frames it must
communicate is the conundrum. Often communicators can presume that competent receivers
already possess the appropriate frames. Let us take financial communications as an example. For
professional readers, the presentation of a company’s history of earnings growth and its current
price earnings ratio will cue a frame of reference within which to look at the stock price. But, we
can quickly imagine three scenarios in which the strict information display model is not adequate.
Scenario 1: the frame of reference is unknown or problematical. The information is an enigma that
cannot be placed into the reader’s known frames. It needs a new frame of reference to make it
intelligible. Scenario 2: the reader is not a professional, but a consumer who needs to be educated as
well as informed. Scenario 3: the reader’s arena of action is substantially separated from the
domains of the information. For example, the reader is presented information about a specific stock
or sector, but he or she must use the information to make decisions about personal spending, and
retirement goals and strategies.
Designers are currently confronting these scenarios, reflected in new information requirements of
changing markets, customization of information for consumers who are increasingly acting as their
own fiduciaries, and particularly in terms of delivering information and providing information
interfaces that are directly actionable by end users. New approaches range from consolidated
information statements, to smart agents, to qualitative (low-resolution) displays. These
considerations bring us to an aspect of communication design that complements the notion of
communication as information display or message: a cognitive process model of communication.
Basic tenets of the cognitive process model can be summarized as follows. The content of a
communication is comprised by the receiver’s formation of a concept: an interpretive frame or
frames of reference, which make the communication intelligible. The communicative content is not
expressed information or subject matter. The content is what is not expressed: what is created by the
receiver using his or her cognitive faculties. Thus, most importantly, communication is the guiding
of cognition, a rational, human, species wide competence. This competence is a constant, which
underlies varied cultural and social beliefs. It is also implicit in communications, as artifacts, which
are created and received not as objects in themselves, but as vehicles of communication.
The cognitive process model of communication proposed here sees the communication not as the
transmission of information, but as a series of challenges, rewards, and resources that provoke and
guide the receiver’s perception, thought, inference, recognition, and memory. This model
complements information presentation or message approaches by concentrating on the receiver as
the one who constructs the interpretive frame. It recognizes the receiver as an active participant. It
balances this by recognizing the communication as an active participant as well. The
communication is not merely a tool, but an interactive partner: indicating the situation, modeling
roles by displaying comportment that is appropriate to the situation, and steering the receiver
toward the frames it wishes the receiver to invoke.
When we speak in terms of the document, we speak of its meaning, while when we speak of the
reader’s participation, we speak of interpretation. The focus on receiver participation stresses
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interpretation. The term “interpretation” can be taken in three ways: identification, meaning or
implication, and evaluation. Of the three, identification is primary and objective: it is who or what
we are seeing or what is happening. Comprehension grows out of the inner consideration of
external objects and events, and evaluation is one’s sense of the objects as related to one’s goals and
desires. Identification is a highly objective, non-idiosyncratic, and rational process. It is out
orientation to the outside world. We count on its objectivity to keep us from walking into doors and
falling down stairs. Communicators count on the rationality and consistency of this process among
receivers and thus on the ability to anticipate, encourage, and accommodate it with appropriate
affordances.

Theory orientation
This paper presents the cognitive process model through research conducted at the Institute of
Design, Illinois Institute of Technology [Storkerson, 2001]. At the heart of this model is the notion
that a receiver must, select or create a frame of reference to make a communication intelligible.
That frame defines the communication’s meaning or content, as distinct from its subject matter, and
it is the primary communication goal or prerequisite. Again, the subject matter may be the price of a
car, while the content may be “Should I buy this car if I want to retire in comfort in fifteen years?”
Increasingly, communications are combining symbolic modes such as language, with sensory
modes: visualizations including charts and diagrams, sounds, motion, navigation, etc. In doing so,
they mix two different human cognitive systems. The distinction can be demonstrated directly. Take
the sentence “The house fell on my head,” and ask how we make sense of it. In terms of word
meanings, it is difficult to find linkages between “house” to “head” that specify their semantic
relations, but it is very easy to make up a little imagined visualization, and watch the house lift up,
rotate, turn upside down and fall on my head [Waltz, 1981]. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine
visualizing symbolic calculation like the old chestnut “All men are mortal. If A. is a man. Then, A.
is mortal.”
Sensory and symbolic cognitive systems are complementary and distinct (Figure 1). Sensory
systems tell us about experience and operate according to experiential dimensions of time and
space. They function narratively, like the house visualization, and are tied to specific events and
locations. Sensory systems organize the flow of experience spontaneously, into the discrete events
and entities of perception, and resolve them by coherence. Symbol systems are category driven.
They require the naming of events and entities: their construal in terms of general categories that
are not tied to any such specific places and events. Symbol systems concentrate on a finite number
of items, calculating and inferring answers on the basis of reasons rather than some overall
coherence. Finally, sensory modes give us experiential knowledge, which is incommensurable with
symbolic knowledge. The house visualization does not just give us more information about the
sentence, it tells us what the sentence might “mean” in terms of experience.
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Figure 1: Mixed model of cognition [after Farah, 1989]
In graphic and multimedia communications, the symbolic and sensory modes must be integrated to
give a single experiential-conceptual amalgam. This cognitive integration gives graphic
communication its power. Cognitive processes combine perception and thought to form concepts or
inferences, which are projected or imagined and compared with direct perception (Figure 2). When
projected inferences and direct perceptions match, the result is recognition, which is a combination
of sensory and conceptual elements resulting in a phenomenology or sense of knowing or grasping
(Figure 3).
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Figure 2: Cognitive process

Figure 3: Cognitive phenomenology
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For example, I see someone new who looks vaguely familiar. I don’t remember her, so I try to think
of whom she looks like. I think of someone, visualize the person as of when I last saw her, and
compare that image with the person in front of me. I recognize and isolate the resemblance, e.g.,
eyes or hair. Now, recollections and feelings about an old acquaintance also enter my mind in a
flood.
Graphic and multimedia communications harness the knowledge built into sensory cognition and
apply it to other domains. A stock price graph relies on symbol systems to refer to days and to
indices, but it is sensory cognition - the ability to run movies in the head - that is behind the implied
motion of diagonal lines and that enables viewers to intuit that prices are “rising” and “falling”.
Thus, graphic communications leverage sensory knowledge and use it to teach about other things,
and to imply narratives.
Image-text composites are even more fascinating. Consider the photograph of Figure 4, left. By
itself, this image has little discernible meaning. Now, forget the image and consider the sentence:
“Joanne used the press as the press used Joanne.” By itself, this sentence is enigmatic. When,
however, the text is placed next to or over the image, the two are combined. Now, we have a new
interpretive frame. It’s a picture of Joanne. We are looking through a picture taken by a press
photographer whom Joanne is fending-off by shielding her face. She is a celebrity and the press are
“using” her by invading her privacy. But, if she is using the press, her pose is also ironic. She is,
perhaps, both fending-off and attracting the press. She is negotiating her celebrity. We cannot
“know” these things in the veridical sense of warranted proof—the picture could be staged and the
caption was certainly added—but the combined image and text convey the meaning by supporting
new interpretive frames and afford us the phenomenology or sense of knowing what we are seeing.
Phenomenological knowing is a primary goal of information design. That intuitive sense of
grasping makes information actionable. Such composite presentations are all the more persuasive
because as receivers, we think we are making our own interpretations.

Figure 4: Image-text cross mode cognition
Once defined, cognitive processes and outputs can be measured as memory. Psychologists have
demonstrated that memory is not a record of stimuli, but of cognitive activity: work and successful
results. We remember the things that we make sense of and we see them as significant in terms of
some set of events or discourse. We remember them as we interpret them: in the forms of meaning
they have for us. We do not, for example, remember details in noise and clutter; we do remember
configurations with form and structure. Memory can be seen in three aspects: retention,
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comprehension which is the depth of processing that is reflected in the entities remembered, and
interpretation which is the structure or organization of what is remembered.
Given that memory tracks cognitive work and its results, the primary cognitive act is integration,
the organization of the perceptual field into distinct events and entities. Successful integration
results in phenomenological knowing which can be measured as confidence. The cognitive work
involved can be measured as processing time or latency. The primary record of cognitive process is
long-term retention: recall (Who was the president during the civil war?), or recognition (Who is in
this picture?). Comprehension can be measured by the conceptual level of memory. Ericsson and
Simon have demonstrated that verbalizations are limited by the sophistication of comprehension
(Ericsson and Simon, 1996). Finally, interpretation can be measured as the selectivity and structure
of memory cues (what part reminds a receiver of what other part).

Figure 5: Cognition and memory

Experiments
This model makes an ambitious claim that bridges from cognitive processes to interpretive content:
“If I know what you remember of a communication, I know how you can think about it, and by
knowing how you can think about it, I know what you think.” Experiments can help determine
whether this claim can be sustained. Two experiments were devised for this purpose. Both used a
computer program to show movies and ask questions about them. Each movie was eight to twelve
seconds long with a single event on video and a spoken text with a single statement or proposition
(Figure 6).
In the first experiment, 40 movies were shown individually to 120 subjects, both male and female,
from 18 to 60 years of age and with varying levels of education. The relations between the modes
(video and spoken text) varied according to whether the video and words explicitly presented
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common subject matter, or concepts, if they implicitly presented common concepts, or if there were
no credible common concepts or subject matter presented. Interpretation was operationalized as the
integration of video and words into a whole. Processing, or cognitive effort was measured by
latency: the length of time required to either make the integration or decide that it was not possible
to do so. Phenomenological knowing was operationalized as reported confidence. Thus, after each
movie, subjects were asked whether the video and words made sense together (yes or no). Then,
subjects were asked how conﬁdent they were of the response. Records were made of responses and
response times.

Figure 6: Experimental movies and questions
From the data, movie scores were constructed for each movie. A movie’s integration score could
range from 0% if all subjects reported segregation, to 100% if all subjects reported integration. Its
confidence score could range from 1 if all responses reported low confidence to 3 if all responses
reported high confidence. Both responses and response times or latencies were collected as data.
Movie scores showed normal distributions with rates of integration varying from approximately
10% to 90%, confidence scores ranging from approximately 1.8 (low-medium confidence) to 2.8
(high confidence) and latencies ranging from .2 sec. to 10 sec (the maximum allowed by the
program). The mean score for integration of movies was 44%, which means that on the whole
movies were integrated 44% of the time. On average, it took almost 2 seconds to respond to the
integration question, about 1 second of which was keying and reaction time. The mean score for
confidence was about 2.4, indicating that most responses were in the moderate to high confidence
range. The confidence latencies averaged near one second, indicating that confidence was not a
considered judgment but a feeling that could be quickly reported.
Integration latency showed a significant U-shaped relationship to integration score (Figure 7),
indicating that the movies that were most often either integrated or segregated were processed most
quickly. Those with scores near 50% took substantially longer to process, indicating that they were
more difficult and required more thinking. Movies with integration scores near 50% were movies
on which subjects split as to whether they could be integrated. In itself, this could be a matter of
cultural or individual differences in interpretation, but other measures indicate that individual
interpretations were not so idiosyncratic. The relationship between integration score and latency
indicates that behind the apparent differences in interpretation for movies with scores near 50%,
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there was greater difficulty in interpretation. This was a strong relationship with an Rsq greater than
40%, significant at the .000 level.
The movies that were difficult to process were also reported as ambiguous. Subjects were most
confident of their judgment with movies scoring high and low on rates of integration (figure 7).
Their confidence dropped as the integration scores approached 50%. This was a very strong
relationship with an Rsq. of 61%, significant at the .000 level.

Figure7: Integration, cognitive difficulty, and confidence
Finally, background information was collected including age, gender and educational attainment.
There were some differences between groups: greater tendencies to integrate, slightly different
mean reported confidence levels, etc. but the relations were the same for all groups.

Second experiment
Experiment 2 focused on the effects of perceptual disturbances on interpretation and memory. This
experiment used 20 of the movies which were used in experiment one, but here, the temporal
relations between video and spoken words were altered yielding nine Delay States including
synchronized presentation (identical to experiment one), and with either video or spoken words
delayed: by one second, with one second overlap, with no overlap, or with a one second gap
between whichever mode was first and the mode presented second (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Delay, precedence, and integration
As in the first experiment, immediately after each movie was shown, subjects were asked if video
and words made sense together, and to report their confidence in their judgment (low, medium, or
high). Also, as in experiment 1, latencies were measured (Figure 6).
The Integration and Confidence results of experiment 2 showed the inhibiting effect of Delay State
on Integration (Figure 8). Integration was highest in the synchronous 0 Delay State, with a score of
52%. It dropped to as low as 35% for Delay States 2 and 3. It dropped significantly, to 43%, with
only a 1 second delay. Figure 8 also shows that it made little or no difference which mode was
delayed, indicating that neither mode carried a predominance of meaning.
Since there was no one-to-one correspondence between videos and words, a delay of one mode
merely altered already arbitrary adjacencies of words and video. It appears that subjects were
attempting to integrate modes based on perceived onset as a cue: trying to realign video and words
using sensory or working memory. The temporal “misalignment” of modes was perceived as such
because it violated the expectation that things that belong together start together. The lesser effect
of a 1 second delay was consistent with compromised cognitive function as delays approach the
limits of perceptual memory.

Integration and memory
In the second part of experiment 2, subjects were tested on their memory via recognition. The
strategy was to re-run each of the movies, presenting one of its two modes—either the video or the
spoken words—while presenting the other mode from four movies including the correct match
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(figure 9). Subjects were asked to correctly match video and words that belong together in the same
movie. In this way, either video or spoken words could serve as a cue for the recollection for the
other, and it might be possible to detect which movies were remembered.

Figure 9: Recognition test; matching video and text
The overall rate of correct identification (Memory) was high: 86% of movies were correctly
identified, compared to a chance 25% correct response rate. The overall Memory Latency, i.e. the
time it took to match video and words was 8.1 seconds. This reflected the difficult job of matching
video and words, which involved memory and discrimination between memories while
presentations were being shown. The mean confidence was 2.55, indicating that subjects were
moderately to very confident of their recollection. Given the high level of correct answers, most of
the calls were probably easy.
The major single finding with respect to memory was that the movies that subjects had integrated
when they first saw them were substantially better remembered than movies that they had not
integrated (Figure 10). Only 7% of integrated movies were not remembered while 13% of not
integrated movies were not remembered. For integrated movies, the variable Delay (regardless of
which mode has precedence) had no significant relationship to memory, but for segregated movies,
delay improved memory from 72% scores for synchronized presentations to as high as 85% for
delay states of one second. As figure 10 shows, memory was highest for overlapping or gaps
between modes.
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Figure 10: Memory, delay, and integration

This finding points toward a second factor beyond integration affecting memory: i.e., cognitive
effort itself. Research on “cognitive interference”, challenges like the one presented by temporal
shifts, indicates that such interference may inhibit initial learning, like integration, but may also
actually “facilitate” longer cognitive effects like memory. (Battig, 1966, 1972) Interference and
facilitation effects are generally beyond the scope of this paper.

Conclusion
This paper has proposed a cognitive processing model of communication in order to bridge the gap
between the physical configuration of communications and received meaning. The goal of this
model was to make a path by which meaning can be operationalized, and tested against physical
variables. It accomplished the goal by relating meaning to cognitive processes with measurable
indicators.
The experiments cited are formative, but they present a strong case for the validity, researchability
and potential usefulness of the cognitive process model. They demonstrate that cognitive processes
are measurable and consistent across a broad population, and that they are related to primary
interpretation (integration), phenomenological knowing (confidence) and memory (recognition).
The use of time delays indicates the potential importance of sensory manipulations in the inhibition
or facilitation of integration and memory as well as the organization of memory (interpretation).
These are formative experiments initiating a larger research program which can include many other
hypotheses and variables. The experimental method has demonstrated the validity of the theoretical
approach based on cognitive function can be resolved into specific predictions and those predictions
can be tested. It has the potential for application as a method for gaining access to a broad range of
variables through cognitive processes. The method can be refined and extended in many ways:
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•

Refinement of variables: Specific parameters like the lengths of movies, and specifications like
the use of videos and spoken texts as distinct from images and written texts could be altered for
comparison and for refinement.

•

New Variables: This method could be used to examine a wide variety of variables including the
use of still photographs, superimposition of text, video montage and quality, the speaker’s age,
race, sex, manner of speaking and tone of voice.

•

Sequence Testing: Experiments could be extended to include associations between different
movies and sequences of movies. It could be used to study the effects of photographic variables,
sound, or music, and it could be used to access a broad variety of socio-cultural attitudes as they
affect interpretation, comprehension and memory.

•

Human-Computer Interaction: Methods could be extended to the domain of human-computer
activities : eliciting and steering human motivation.

•

In situ testing: The experimental methods used here could be applied unobtrusively outside of
the laboratory, in real-world situations and integrated into design processes.

The approach and the research presented in this paper has direct implications to communication
design on 3 levels: findings, theory, and meta-theory: i.e., a theoretical base that can be used to
produce hypotheses regarding design practice.
•

Findings: It generates findings in the domain of communication design: practical advice for
communication designers. Some findings may be surprising, such as the facilitating effects of
interference. These findings can be used to predict and measure results, and to creatively
explore new design possibilities.

•

Modeling: It presents a theoretical model of communications that is testable: it can be used to
make hypotheses that can be affirmed or refuted.

•

Empirical methods: It builds an experimental method that can be used to generate and test new
hypotheses and in that way to refine, extend and produce new models.

•

Using this simple procedure, it is possible to incorporate assessment into communications as
they are being used.

This approach demonstrates that it is possible to build models that are both theoretically
sophisticated and empirically researchable. It takes a step toward communication design as a
theoretically informed, research-based enterprise that can specify and design communicative
outcomes and assess performance.
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